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ABSTRACT
In this paper I offer an alternative identification assumption that allows one to test for changing
patterns regarding the international propagation of shocks when endogenous variables, omitted variables,
and heteroskedasticity are present in the data.  Using this methodology, I demonstrate that the propagation
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aggregate shocks as the primary transmission mechanisms in this process.
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The Mexican, Asian, and Russian crises generated a sequence of stock market and exchange
rate collapses in several emerging markets. These collapses, and the processes that generated
them, have driven the literature to ask exactly how these shocks were transmitted interna-
tionally and why with such intensity. Was it because, as some believe, the linkages between
countries grew stronger during these crises? Or was it because they were already strong
before the crises took place?
This question is important, at least from a theoretical point of view, because the answer
allows us to discriminate between two competing classes of theory regarding the interna-
tional propagation of shocks: namely, those for which the transmission mechanism is crisis
contingent, and those for which it is not. The first set of theories are based, primarily, on
multiple equilibrium, endogenous liquidity and political contagion viewpoints. In general,
they imply that the propagation of shocks is exacerbated by, and contingent upon, crises.
The second set of theories, however, addressing such matters as trade, learning, herding, and
aggregate shocks, imply that the transmission mechanism is symmetric and stable through
time.
In this paper, therefore, I develop a procedure with which one can test for changes in the
way in which shocks are propagated. Using daily data from a total of 36stock market indices,
I show that, on average, the transmission mechanism during the turmoil was significantly
different from that during tranquil periods in only ten percent of cases. These findings clearly
cast considerable doubt upon the validity of the "first" set of theories.
The test is based on a new identification assumption that solves the problem of endoge-
nous variables under heteroskedasticity and omitted variables. It is rooted in the assumption
that, during crises, the degree of variance exhibited by disturbances is likely to increase.1
Consequently, I demonstrate herein a test in which the joint null hypothesis is that if the
degree of variance exhibited by only one of the structural shocks increases, the transmission
mechanism is stable. The test is then rejected if either the transmission mechanism changes
(the scenario of most interest to this paper), or if two or more disturbances increase their de-
gree of variance. This identification assumption has an instrumentalvariable interpretation,
and the test is implemented as a Hausman-type specification test.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, the theories and the empirical evidence
regarding the measurement of the international propagation of shocks is summarized. In
section 3, the problems with the standard measures are highlighted and a new procedure
is advanced. In addition, the instrumental variables interpretation is developed, and its
relationship with the existing literature on changes in regime is examined. In section 4, this
new identification procedure is applied to the daily data, produced between 1993 and 1998,
of 36 stock markets. Finally, in section 4 conclusions and extensions are discussed.
1For example, during the Mexican crisis, the daily innovations in stock market returns in the month
following December 19th, 1994 were 16 times more volatile than those in the month prior to it.
12 A Review on the international propagation of shocks.
In this section, I first summarize the theories regarding the international propagation of
shocks that have been advanced in the literature, indicating as I do so the effect they may
have on the transmission channel. Finally, I review some of the empirical literature available.
2.1 Theories
As mentioned above, theories concerning the propagation of shocks can be divided into two
broad classes: namely, the crisis contingent, and the non crisis contingent.
Within the first class, three basic frameworks have been discussed in the literature. The
first of these proposes that multiple equilibrium is responsible for the transmission of crises,
i.e., that a crisis in one country will be used as a sunspot by those in other countries.
(Masson, 1997). The basic idea is simply that the crisis in the first country affects investors'
expectations in the second, upsetting the equilibrium of the latter economy and causing a
crash. This theory not only explains the bunching of crisis, but also speculative attacks
to economies that look, in principle, to be healthy.2 From the propagation point of view,
then, during the period of crisis the transmission of the shock is governed by a change
of investors' expectations rather than by real linkages. In other words, the change in the
price of the second market relative to that of the first is exacerbated during the shift in the
equilibria: an excess degree of co-movement should be expected and, therefore, the measnred
propagation is different.
The second framework is built around the theory that liquidity shocks affecting market
participants will lead to a sell-off causing excess co-movement in asset's prices.3 Valdes [1996]
analyses the impact of a liquidity shock upon the portfolio recomposition across emerging
market, and he shows that a crisis in one country, leading to a liquidity shock in investor's
capital, can in turn drive resources out of other assets. The bottom line is that investors
require capital in order to operate in the market, whether to satisfy margin calls, meet
regulatory requirements, or because they are credit rationed. Therefore, a crisis in one
country generates a capital loss that increases the degree of rationing taking place and, in
turn, forces investors to sell their other holdings. If there are price effects in those markets,
further crashes are realized. Therefore, once again, from the propagation point of view, the
collapse of prices is driven by the presence of a severe liqnidity shock.4
In addition, Calvo [1999] studies an economy in which there exists asymmetric infor-
mation among investors. Informed investors receive signals about the fundamentals of the
2This point has been raised by Radelet and Sachs [1998a, 1998b], Sachs, Tornell and Velasco [1996),
among others.
3Liquidity issues have been raised as an important component of the contagion in the recent Russian
crisis. See Calvo [1999].
41n the case of Valdes[1996], it is the increase in the degree of rationing at the investors side what
generates the comovement in the stock markets. Several other mechanism can be thought: margin calls (as
in Calvo[199]), or debt rollover (as in Cole & Kehoe[1996]).
2country and are hit by liquidity shocks. The liquidity shock (in Calvo's case it is a margin
call) forces informed investors to sell their holdings. However, uninformed investors cannot
distinguish between the liquidity shock and a bad signal and, therefore, they charge a pre—
mium on the asset when the informed investors are net sellers. In this case, the increase
in the relative asymmetric information generates a co—movement across all the asset-class.
Once again then, the propagation of shocks across assets is governed by the liquidity shock.
Finally, Drazen [1998} studies the European devaluations of early 199o's, argues that
political economy issues could explain the bunching of those crises. His model assumes that
there are political pressures upon the Central Bank Presidents to maintain the exchange
regime. When one country decides to abandon the peg, it reduces the political costs (of
similarly abandoning the standard) for the next country in line. Consequently, a sequence
of exchange rate crises occur.
In conclusion, these theories have two important empirical implications: Firstly, the
effects on the propagation mechanism are, clearly, short lived (It is hard to argue that
liquidity shocks or sunspot dynamics can last for long periods). Secondly, the theories imply
that crises are inherently different from periods of tranquility. In particular, the models
predict an increase in the propagation of international shocks during crises.5
The second class of theories study the propagation of shocks as independent of the exis-
tence of crises. These theories are based around the role of trade6, monetary policy coordi-
nation, learning7, and aggregate shocks, such as international interest rates, aggregate shifts
in risk aversion, random liquidity shocks, and world demand. These theories have two main
implications: Firstly, stock market indexes tend to be integrated with one another. Thus,
they are endogenous variables and, therefore, the tests have to be designed to take care of
this problem. Secondly, these theories imply that the methods by which shocks are trans-
mitted, during both tranquil periods and periods of crisis, are similar. Moreover, they argue
that positive and negative shocks have symmetric effects. This is because there is no reason
to assume, for example, that trade will change during the period of the crisis (typically a
month) in such a way that the propagation mechanism is significantly affected.8
2.2 Empirical literature
The empirical literature addressing the transmission of international shocks can be divided
in four strands.
5lmportant exceptions to this remark are the theories based on liquidity, if and only if those shocks are
uncorrelated with the markets. In other words, they are exogenous and symmetric shocks and not margin
calls. In this case, the transmission mechanism is stable through time.
6For the first paper (as far as I know) that deals with this issue see Gerlach and Smets [1995]. A recent
paper (based on microfoundations with all the bells and whistles) see Corsetti et.al. [1998]
7Here I call learning all those papers in which there is pure learning (Rigobon [1998]), as well as the
theories of hearding and informational cascades (Chari & Kehoe [1999], and Calvo & Mendoza [1998]).
8These theories have been identified in the literature with real linkages, even though some of them are
not.
3Firstly, the propagation has been measured in terms of the correlation between stock
markets. The main hypothesis is to test whether or not the propagation changes before and
after the crisis. King & Wadhwani [1990] stndy the correlation between U.S., U.K. and Japan
around the time of the 1987 stock market crash. They find that the degree of correlation
increases after October of 1987. Similarly, Lee & Kim [1993] analyze twelve major markets
during the same period, and also find that the average weekly correlation increased from 0.23
to 0.39. Finally, Bertero & Mayer [1990] show that while stock markets in some countries
reacted sharply to the U.S. stock market crash, others appeared unaffected. The market's
vulnerability was not significantly related to the market size, nor its average volume. They
find that the propagation is larger to those markets in which there existed circuit breakers
and/or capital controls, and they also report that correlations across major regional indices
increase after the crash and remain above-average for several months.9
Secondly, the transmission of crisis is instead measured as the propagation of volatility
using an auto-regressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) framework. Such papers find
significant spillovers taking place across major stock markets during the October 1987 crisis
(see Chou, Ng & Pi [1994], and Hamao, Masulis & Ng [1990]). Additionally, Edwards [1998]
studies whether there had been volatility propagation in the bond market to Argentina or
Chile following the Mexican crisis, and he concludes, using an augmented GARCH model,
that there had been considerable spillover from Mexico to Argentina, but not to Chile.
Edwards is, in this paper, more concerned with the properties of the propagation mechanism
when capital controls are imposed; however, his evidence supports the existence of significant
interrelationships between countries.
Third, changes in the long run relationship between two stock markets are measured as
shifts in the cointegrating vector. Longin & Slonik [1995] consider seven OECD countries
from 1960 to 1990 and report that average correlations in stock market returns between the
U.S. and other countries have risen by about 0.36 over this thirty-year period.'0 However,
most of the contagion events observed since Mexico have been short run events (at most 3
months) and cointegrating techniques are unlikely to detect such dynamics.
Finally, several papers concentrate upon the estimation of the propagation of news across
countries, separating regular channels (such as trade) from channels that are related to crisis
contingent theories (country similarities and multiple equilibria, for example). Eichengreen,
Rose & Wyplosz [1996] estimate the probability that a crisis in one country would affect
the probability that a second coming under attack. To do this, they study the collapse of
the fixed exchange rates in Europe at the end of 1992, and find that the probability that
a country would suffer a speculative attack increases when another one in the union was
under pressure. They also find that the propagation mechanism is based primarily upon
trade and not upon any similarities between the countries in question. Likewise, Click and
Rose [1998] study several crises (1971, 1973, 1992, 1994, and 1997) and show, as above, that
9See Karolyi & Stulz [1996] for another application to the US-Japan markets. See also Pindyck &
Rotemberg [1993] for testing comovements in individual stock prices, and Pindyck & Rotemberg [1990] for
commodity prices. See Masson [1997] for an application regarding speculative attacks.
'°See also Cashin, Hnmar & McDermott [1995].
4trade linkages drive a substantial proportion of the transmission mechanism of crises.1
In summary then, there is some evidence that suggests the existence of shifts in the prop-
agation mechanism (specially when it is measured as excess co-movements during periods of
crisis); however, the evidence is, at best, mixed.
3 Measuring changes in the propagation mechanism
In this section, I discuss the main limitation of the standard measures of the propagation
mechanism when the data exhibits the following three problems: heteroskedasticity, en-
dogenous variables, and omitted variables. Secondly, I offer a procedure, based on a new
identification assumption, with which to test for the stability of the transmission mecha-
nism. I analyze its instrumental variable interpretation, as well as its asymptotic properties.
Finally, its relationship with the standard literature regarding regime shift is discussed.
Assume that there are two countries whose stock markets returns (Xt and yt) are described
by the following model:
lit = (1)
=&Yt+Zt+Th (2)
E[1]et]=0,E[zet] = 0,E[zq]=0 (3)
E[ss]= a,E[ijij]= a,E[zztJ= (4)
where Zt is an unobservable aggregate shock (which has been normalized for simplicity),
s andare the country specific shocks -assumedto be independent but not necessarily
identically distributed. Without loss of generality assume that the returns have mean zero.
This model is rich enough to encompass several of the aspects discussed in the theory, and
the three problems indicated above. Firstly, given the theories discussed above stock markets
are, in general, endogenous variables (&,30). Secondly, there are common shocks to both
markets, here summarized as z, which includes shocks such as the international interest rate,
international demand, market attitudes toward risk, and liquidity shocks, etc. Note that it
has been assumed that s is independent of Xt and lit. However, if this is not the case, the
equations (1) and (2) should be interpreted as a reduce form and Zt should be seen as the
innovation to the third equation, which here it has been omitted. Thirdly, the variance of
the idiosyncratic shocks changes through time to reflect the conditional heteroskedasticity
in the data. Finally, no specific assumption on the functional form of the distribution of the
errors is made, other than that the first two moments satisfy equations (3) and (4).
"See Kaminsky & Reinhart [1998] for a similar approach. Also see Baig & Goldfajn [1998]. They study
the recent Asian crises and compute the effect of news in one country upon another's stock market. They
find that a sizeable propagation of such news is to neighbor countries. See also Calvo & Reinhart [1995] for
another procedure based on principal components with similar conclusions.
5The goal of the test is to determine whether a,j3, or'y change during the crises. However,
in this setup, the standard measures of the propagation mechanism, as well as the tests of
stability, are either biased or, alternatively, do not allow for the short run nature of the more
recent crises.
First of all, estimations of the cointegrating vector will be biased if the omitted variable
is also integrated. Bearing in mind that the omitted variable includes aggregate demand
as well as the stock prices in other markets this problem is likely to be present. Moreover,
cointegrating tests require long series, and the recent crises have, in general, been short run
events. For example, the longest was the Mexican crisis, lasting less than 4 months. Secondly,
GARCH models estimate excessive volatility propagation in the presence of endogenous vari-
ables. In other words, there is an identification problem in which the change in the variance
can result from shifts in the coefficients, or heteroskedasticity of the structural shocks. The
GARCH model estimates a reduce form and, consequently, excess variance spillover is likely
to be obtained. Thirdly, Probit regressions are biased when heteroskedasticity has not been
properly taken into account. As is shown by Lomakin & Paiz [1999] adjusting the thresh-
olds regarding the definition of a crisis, by considering the conditional variance, diminishes
the importance of linkages across countries. However, this adjustment is far from desirable
and, further research is needed in this area. Finally, the correlation estimate is biased if
the variances shift. This is because the correlation does not belong to the class of unbiased
estimators and, therefore, changes in the variance of residuals will tend to bias the estimates
upward.
In the first three cases, the problem cannot be solved unless more information is provided.
In the last case, there are some circumstances (restrictive though) in which it is possible to
correct the bias.'2 Assume, for example, that a =0,Z =0for all t, and=afor all t.




Underthese conditions, equation (5) can be estimated by OLS. Assume the sample is split
according to the variance of ij,. Also assume that the variance of the residual can be written
as
var(r)= (1+ 6)var(ij)
"This has been highlighted before by Ronn [1998]. As is indicated there, this result was proposed by Rob
Stambaugh in a discussion of the Karolyi & Stulz [1995] paper at the May NBER Conference on Financial
Risk Assessment and Management. In the mathematicnl literature, the oldest reference I have found is
Liptser & Shiryayev [19781, chapter 13. There, the result is known as the theorem on normal correlation.
6for some positive 8, and where I (h) stands for low (high) variance sample.
This split does not affect condition (7), therefore the estimates of 3 are consistent in each
of the sub-samples. Formally, plim /3" =plirn31 However, by construction, the variance in
the h sample is larger than the variance in the 1 sample. Consequently, to assure consistency
in the estimates of 13, the asymptotic covariance has to increase by exactly in the same
proportion:
cova (4',y')=(1+ 8)cova (4,y)
Substituting in equation (5) it can be shown that the relationship between the variances
of litinthe two samples is
var(y) =var(y).[i + 5p12]
where p' is the correlation between Xt and lit in the low variance sample. Finally, the
correlation in the high variance sample can be written as,
1/2
PhPt . (8)
Note that equation (8) is a strictly increasing function of 8. Therefore, during crises when
the variance of the underlying shocks increases, the estimated correlation is larger than is the
case in periods of tranquility. The tests on changes in the propagation mechanism, conse-
quently, must be performed on the unconditional moments, as oppose to on the couditional
ones. 13
Theintuition of why this bias exists is simple. Assume in equation (5) the variance of
Xtgoesto zero. In this scenario, all the innovations in lit are explained by its idiosyncratic
shock and the correlation between Xtandlit is zero. Now assume the variance of Xtstartsto
increase and, clearly, more fluctuations in litcanthen be explained by Xt. In the limit, when
the variance of Xt is so large that makes the innovations of e, negligible, all the fluctuations in
litareexplained by Xt. Thus, the correlation is one. Note that in this exercise the propagation
'3Forbes & Rigobon [1998] use a two step estimator to compute the implied unconditional correlation in
crises. During the crisis both the conditional correlation (ph) and the relative increase in the conditional
variance (5t1)arecomputed. Using equation (8), the implied unconditional correlation was determined. The
test is whether or not the unconditional correlation during crises times is larger than (or different from) the
unconditional correlation in tranquil periods. They compare the correlation coefficients for stock market
indexes at the time of the Mexican and the Asian crises. They use daily data on 28 stock markets from 1993
to 1998, and show that, if the test is performed on conditional moments substantial contagion is present
in the data (measured as a statistically significant increases in the correlation during crises). When the
estimates are adjusted, however, few cases are found.
7(fi) between XtandYthas remainedconstant. Changes in the relative variance of the two
shocks modifies the noise/signal ratio, thereby biasing the estimates of the correlation.
The derivation of eqnation (8) assumes that there are no problems of endogeneity or omit-
ted variables. If they are present, however, condition (7) is not satisfied and the adjustment
in the correlation estimate can not be performed without further information.
3.1 A new methodology to test for changes in the transmission
channel
In this section, I discuss a new procedure to test for changes in regime in the face of problems
of endogenous variables, omitted variables, and/or heteroskedasticity. First, I describe the
general characteristics of the test. Second, I discuss its instrumental variables interpretation
and its asymptotic distribution. Finally, I highlight its relationship with the current tests
on changes of regime.






[(1 + a7) Zt+m+n] (10)




Toshow how the identification problem is solved, first assume thatincreases by (1 + 6)
at time t, and that all the other variances and parameters in the model remain constant.
The conditional variance covariance matrix (conditional at t) is then:
— 1(fl+7)2u+fl2a(1+6)+a (fl+7)(1+n)a+fla(1+ö)+na —
(1
—fl)2 . (1+ cry)2 a + a (1 + 6) + n2a
Computing the change in the variance covariance matrix as the difference between the con-
ditional and unconditional, the following is obtained
R(lfl)2[fi 1.
(11)
8There are two important remarks about equation (11): First, the determinant is equal to
zero for any change in the variance (8), any variance of the structural shocks (o, a, and
o) and any parameter a, /3,and'y. This will be true for all the cases in which there is only
one shock whose variance increases. Second, /3 is fully identified either by dividing an12 by
Q22, or Aft1 by AQ22. This is the overidentifying restriction that allows to derive the IV
test in the next section.
Let's summarize these properties in a proposition:
Proposition 1 If two stock market indexes satisfy a reduce form model described by equa-
tions (I) to (4),andif ONLY one variance of a structural shock (se, 1j,orzt) increases,
then the change in the variance covariance matrix has determinant equal to zero.
5232/3 Aft =(_)2/3 when o changes




= 5a(1+a)\1+cry)1+a7when a changes (1—n/3) 1 1+cry
In each case, some parameter (or combination of parameters) from the original model
can be identified. Furthermore, and independently of the parameter to be estimated and














These two estimators have the same limit under the null hypothesis. Thus, they can be
used to set either an overidentifying test or a Hausman specification test. This identification
procedure is in the spirit of the original IV estimation of Flaavelmo [1947] and Koopmans,
et. al. [1950]. This IV interpretation is discussed in the next section.
3.2 An Instrumental Variables interpretation
In Figure 1, I have depicted the typical problem faced when attempting to estimate with
endogenous variables. There is both a supply and a demand curve together with some
realizations of the shocks. Assume that the coefficient of interest is the slope of the demand
curve. In the top panel, it is impossible to estimate the slope of the demand curve because
9the shocks are to both the demand and the supply curve. The sointion, therefore, is to find
an instrument that shifts the supply curve, thereby enabling the slope of the demand curve
to be computed.
In the bottom panel, an increase in the variance of the supply disturbances is shown. This
rise in the variance has a similar effect as to find a valid instrument for the demand equation.
In this case, on average, the supply curve is moving relatively more iu the sub-sample with
the higher variance than the demand curve.14 In other words, the increase in the variance in
the supply cnrve is equivalent to allowing a variable, present only in that equation, to move
more; consequently, we can achieve identification.
Furthermore, this interpretation allows to provide a simple intuition to which parameter
is being estimated in each of the three cases discussed in proposition (1). When the variance
in the equation Xt increases the instrumental variable estimates are the "total" effect of
country Xt on country l/t, where "total" indicates both the direct and the indirect effects
(for example, the effect of trading in a common third market). Conversely, if the variance
in the 1½ equation is the one that increases, then the parameter estimated is the effect from
lit to Xt. Both these cases are measuring the propagation of shocks from one country to
the other. Finally, the last case is when the variance of the common shock increases. This
is probably the most interesting one. The parameter estimated is Note that this is
the ratio between the coefficients of zinequations (9) and (10). This is a measure of how
sensitive is country lit with respect to country Xt when there is an aggregate shock (Zt). In
other words, this is a measure of how "vulnerable" the former is relative to later.
3.2.1 Definition of the instruments
To fix the intuition, assume that there is an increase in the variance of ij,. The null hypothesis
is, of course, that all the parameters and the rest of the variances, remain the same. The
equation to be estimated is the following:
lit =/3xt+ 7Zt + Et
As before, let's split the sample between high and low variance:
and
Assnme the instruments wandw?aredefined as follows:






where T" and T' are the sample sizes of the high and low variance respectively. These
parameters are needed only in small samples -inlarge samples they are irrelevant- however,
in the empirical implementations it does make a difference to include them.
Let's first check that the instruments indeed reproduce equations (12) and (13). The IV
estimators are the following:
1 h'h 1(it
2,1 1' \1 it -rX lit —
/.)=t\WXt)WtY(1 h'h 1lii' Xt X —
1hih 1IiI
2,2 1 2i\1 2'prlit lit TYtYt =t\WXt)WtYt1 hihlit!' Yt x — TrYtXt
which are exactly equations (12) and (13) respectively.
Additionally, these instruments are valid if they are correlated with the right hand side:
plirn [w'xt] $0,and not correlated with the disturbances: plim [w'Et] =0and plirrt [wzt] =
0.Substituting with the definitions of the variables, the first set of conditions are:
plim [w"xtJ =plirn4'x'




Both instruments are correlated with the right hand side under the null hypothesis that
the variance ofincreases.
Meanwhile, the second set of conditions imply:





1 (var(4') — var(e)) =0 (18)
which is equal to zero (under the null hypothesis) if the variance of the structural shock in
the y-equation remains constant, and
11plum [w'zt] =plirnx4L
—plimx'z





It is easy to show, too, that the conditions for the second instrument are similar, up to a
constant, to equations (18) aud (19):
plum [w'st] = (var(s)-var(e))=0 (20)
plirn [zo zt] =
1—nfl(var(z ) —var(z))=0 (21)
In conclusion, under the null hypothesis both instruments are valid. In order to develop
an overideutification test or a Hausman specification test, these instruments have to be
invalid under the alternative hypothesis. This is the topic of the next section.
3.2.2 The instruments under the alternative hypothesis
There are two circumstances in which the instruments are invalid: Firstly, when two or
more structural shock variances increase, and secondly, when the transmission mechanism
changes.
To address the first case, note that if there are two shocks increasing their variances, then
at least two of conditions (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), or (21) will fail. In particular, two out
of the last four will definitely not be satisfied.
As regards of the second, if there is a change in a, fi or 'y, conditions (16) and (17)
will probably be satisfied because the variances and covariances are likely to be different in
the two samples. However, (18), (19), (20), and/or (21) will not be satisfied. In order to
illustrate this case, assume the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks remain constant. The
conditions are as follows:
12• 1' 2 ___________________ plim[wt Et] =U —________
1h/3h1_a1/31
• 1' 2l+cyh 1+cY'y1
plim [W Ztl =a —
L J 1—h/3'1 —&/31
• 2' 2 1 1




plim[tot Ztj =aI —
[l—cx'73"1—cv'/131
Note that if only one coefficient changes (for example /3) the setof parameters that satisfy
all four conditions has measure zero. If all three parameters change,still is the case that the
set has measure zero.
Finally, note that equations (16) to (21) imply that thebias in the estimator is different
for each of the two instruments. This allows us to define a testin which under the null
hypothesis, the two estimators have the same limit,but under the alternative hypothesis
they are inconsistent and with different limits.This test is somewhat like the Hausman
specification test.
H0; =
Now, let's summarize these results in a proposition.
Proposition 2 w defined in equations (14) and (15) arevalid instruments for:
• /3 if and only if there is an increase in the variance of retwhich is only the result of
changes in the variance of m
•& if and only if there is an increase in the variance of ywhich is only the result of
changes in the variance of Et.
•f ifand only if there is an increase in the variance of ret and y, which is onlythe
result of changes in the variance of Zt.
Under the alternative hypothesis the instrumental variables estimators areinconsistent.
3.2.3 Asymptotic properties of the instruments
Given the IV characteristic of the estimators, it becomes straightforward to derive their
asymptotic properties. Firstly, as it was shown in the previoussection, the estimators are
13consistent in each of the three cases under the null hypothesis. Secondly, the estimators are
asymptotically normal, bnt not efficient. Again, for simplicity assnme that we are studying
the first case in which the variance of rjincreases.The asymptotic distribntion of the
estimator is




=urn (;+ e')' (; + Ej).
Finally, the two estimators have an asymptotic covariance given by,
—
/3)(2— /3)—W1'12W2'
whereW is defined as equation (22) and E1'2 is
=hm (z+ej)' (Zt + Ct)
Using these asymptotic distributions it is possible to define a test whether or not the
estimators (using the two instrnments) are equal. Under the null hypothesis they have the
same limit, but under the alternative hypothesis their bias is different.
3.3 Relationship with the existing literature
The test developed here is in the spirit of the standard structural change tests, however,
it differs in at least one important dimension: it does not requires the estimation of the
parameter of interest in order to determine if it has changed or not. This characteristic
of the test is, perhaps, the most important aspect. The standard methodologies have to
estimate the parameters and, therefore, they cannot be implemented if there are problems
of endogenous or omitted variables.
To illustrate the intuition, let's simplify equation (1) by eliminating the problem of en-
dogeneity (a =0).Assume that the variance of the aggregate shock is allowed to increase.
The standard test of structural change estimates the coefficient 3 in two separate samples.
In this case, the OLS estimate of /3 is biased and will be given by:
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Notethat the bias increases when a rises. Therefore, the standard tests of structural change
could detect an increase in the estimated value of /3 because there is a rise in the variance
of the omitted variable in one of the sub-samples, and not because the true /3 has changed.
Without further structure, however, it is impossible to solve the problem of identification.
The IV test described here has been constructed to deal with these problems. The only
additional information it requires is that the tranquil and crises periods are known. Usually,
of course, the starting days in those crises are obvious; however, it is often the case that
pinpointing the final day is somewhat more difficult. Consequently, sensitivity analysis must
be performed to evaluate the robustness of the results obtained.
4 Empirical Evidence
In this section, an application of the procedure developed previously is presented. The
identification assumption requires a shift in the second moments at some point in time. The
recent financial crisis is a relatively clean example of those shifts.
The data was collected from Datastream, and it consists of daily stock market returns
(both in dollars and in domestic currency) for 36 countries, covering the period from January
1993 to December 1998. The countries studied were: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Columbia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,
Russia, Singapore, Korea, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Swiss, Taiwan, Thailand, UK, USA,
and Venezuela. Short term interest rates covering the same period and frequency were also
collected.
4.1 Testing for Changes in the Transmission Mechanism
In order to allow for trends, lags and aggregate shocks (at least partially) the following VAR
specification was estimated in the full sample.
=c+ cb(L)st + t(L)i + et (23)
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where n and in represent a pair of countries in the sample, (.)andb(.) are lag operators,
starethe stock market returns, i, are the daily interest rates, and r are the reduce form
residuals. The preferred estimation is one in which s is defined as the two days returns in
15dollars, where one day lag is allowed, and all three interest rates are included. Nevertheless,
several sensitivity analyses were performed.
Three crises are studied: The Mexican crisis in December 1994, the Hong Kong crisis in
October 1997, and the Russian crisis in August 1998.15
Twodays returns are used because there are different times in which the markets are
open, and the consequent possibility that a shock in one country occurs while another is
closed, meaning that the effect is observed a day later. One lag is used to control for the
serial correlation implied by the construction of the two day returns. The interest rates
are included to partially offset for aggregate shocks (iFS) and domestic monetary policies
(i, ir). The tranquil period is defined as the 60 working days prior to each crisis, while
the turmoil period is defined as ending 10 working days after the crisis commences. The
tranquil period of 3 months is short enough to assure that two crisis are not present in the
sample; however, for the Asian crises, the tranquil period was defined as January to June.
The turmoil period of two weeks usually includes most of the action observed in the stock
markets (except during the Mexican crash where the collapse took more than three months).
In the robustness section several of these parameters are altered in order to evaluate the
sensitivity of the results.
Finally, note that in equation (23) it has been assumed that the trend as well as the
parameters (.)and1(.) remain constant between tranquil and crisis periods. If there is
a shift in these coefficients, then they are captured in changes in the variance covariance
matrix of the residuals. Thus, the procedure is able to reject in those circumstances, too.
The residuals obtained from the first step VAR are used to run the test proposed in
the previous section: Given the tranquil and crisis windows, the two instrumental variables
estimators are computed. These instruments are defined by equations (14) and (15) and the
estimates are obtained using equations (12) and (13). The test is thus to determine if the
two estimators are statistically the same. Their joint asymptotic variance-covariance matrix
is described in section 3.2.3.
In the next three sections, each of the crises is analyzed. The robustness check and the
measures of propagation as well as the relative vulnerability are discussed later.
4.1.1 Mexican Crisis: Tequila Effect
The Mexican crisis started with the abandonment of the exchange rate regime in December
19, 1994. There are two other important events to account for, though. In January 9,
the news that part of the debt was not going to be rollover was announced, and the next
day the negotiations for a bailout program started. The fact that the crisis was not resolved
faster produced a long period of deterioration and negative returns (of around three months).
In the robustness section, I look at how the results change when this window is modified;
15The exact date for each crisis is as follows: Mexico abandoned the regime in December 19, 1995, Hong
Kong occurred in October 17, 1997, and Russia crashed in August 13, 1998. Sensitivity analysis were
performed on the starting date of the crisis (plus or minus 5 days) and the results were qualitatively the
same.
16however, it is important to remember that extending the period of crisis will capture the
additional shocks in Jannary.
The crisis window covers a period of two weeks (10 days) and the tranquil window are
the three months prior to the crash (60 days).
The first step regression is implemented using 2 day returns and 1 lag. After obtaining the
residuals, the instrumental variables estimates are computed. Table (1), shows the estimation
of the parameter using the two instruments. The missing countries are absent due to a lack
of information, usually regarding interest rates. The upper triangular matrix are the results
obtained by using the first instrument only, while the lower half are the estimates using the
second instrument.
The results of testing if the parameters are stable are shown in table (2). The upper
half is the standard deviation of the difference of the two estimated coefficients, and the
lower half indicates whether or not the coefficients are statistically different at a 95 percent
confidence; a 1 indicates the pair of countries in which the test is rejected.
[Insert table here]
Table 1: Estimation of beta for the 1994 Mexican crisis.
[Insert table here]
Table 2: Results of Hausman Specification Test. 1994 Mexican crisis.
As was indicated previously, if the country that has the crisis is among the pair analyzed,
the instruments identify the direct propagation mechanism. In the upper half of table (1),
the column country represents the base country (the Xtinour model, equations 1 and 2).
For example, this means that the coefficient corresponds to 43whenit is under the Mexican
column, and it is 1/43 when it is on the Mexican row.
On the other hand, when the country under crisis is not one of the pair, the instrumental
variable identify the vulnerability of the two countries with respect to the common shock.
This implies that the rest of the coefficients in the upper triangle indicates how vulnerable
is the row country relative to the column country.
Finally, the lower half of the matrix is symmetric to the upper half, which allows to make
direct comparisons between the two estimates of the coefficients.
In order to fixed ideas lets see three examples: Mexico-Argentina, Mexico-Peru, and
US-Argentina.
1. On table (1) on the Argentinean row, the coefficient below the Mexican column is
0.31. This is the direct transmission mechanism from Mexico to Argentina. Under
the Argentinean column and in the Mexican row, the coefficient is 0.26. The previous
17estimate was obtained using the first instrument, while the last one was computed
using the second instrument. These two estimates have to be compared in order to
determine if the parameters are stable. In table (2) the standard deviation is 0.02, and
under the Argentinean colnmn and Mexican Row a 1 indicates that the test that these
estimates are statistically the same is rejected at the 95 percent confidence.
2. Regarding Mexico and Peru, in the upper half the coefficient is found under the Peru
column and on the Mexican row. This means that the coefficient is 1/B. Using the first
instrument the estimate is 33.2 which corresponds to a transmission equal to 0.031,
while the estimate using the second instrument is 9.47, which implies a coefficient equal
to 0.106. The standard deviation is 59.8. Note that the standard deviation is for the
difference between the inverse of the two coefficients. As can be seen, it is not possible
to reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients are the same, implying that in this
case, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the transmission from Mexico to
Peru is stable.
3. Finally, under the US column, the Argentinean coefficient is 3.116, using the first in-
strument, and —11 using the second one. The standard deviation is 8.88, which implies
that it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the two estimates are the same.17
In table (2), only in 2.4 percent of the cases (12 out of 496) the test is rejected. However,
one of these 12 pairs is of particular interest to us: Mexico-Argentina. In fact, it was this
relationship that initiated most of the public discussion on this literature. It is indeed true
that one explanation of this result could be that Argentina suffered another shock during
the period in question; however this is unlikely given the short span of the windows used.
Consequently, the results suggest that, at least as regards to Mexico and Argentina, the
transmission mechanism was not entirely stable during the Tequila crisis.
Unfortunately, aside from this case, the other 10 pairs in which the test is rejected do
not show any pattern.
Finally, it is possible to argue that the problems in the propagation mechanism should be
more important in less developed markets. Concentrating upon non-OECD countries (plus
Mexico and Korea) there are 15 countries with data (which implies 105 pairs). Among these
pairs in only 3 cases (2.9 percent) a rejection is found: Mexico-Argentina, Mexico-Malaysia,
and Singapore-Korea. Again, there does not seem to be more rejections in this sub-sample,
and there is no clear pattern on the rejections either.
4.1.2 Hong Kong Crash: Asian Flu
The Hong Kong crisis started October 17, 1997. This crisis is particularly difficult to isolate
because the Korean crisis occurred at the end of December, and the whole region was in crisis
16This should be read as Argentina been three times more vulnerable than US to a Mexican shock.
17lnterestingly, the 3.1 coefficient is significantly different from zero, but not the -11 estimate.
18from June until September. Therefore, the period of tranquility is defined from January 1997
and ends prior to the Thailand's abandonment.18
On the other hand, one of the nice properties of the Hong Kong crisis is that it was a
sharp shock and most of the fluctuation occurred within two weeks. This contrasts with the
Mexican crisis that extended for more than three months.
It is possible, then, to isolate the crisis period (at least) by concentrating the crisis window
only around the two weeks after the initial crash. As will be discussed in the robustness
section, when the crisis window is extended to include the Korean crisis, substantial rejections
occur.
Table (3) shows the estimates using the two instrument under the preferred specification.
This table should be interpreted in the same manner as before -thedirect propagation
mechanism is the one in the Hong Kong column and row, and the rest of the coefficients
represent the relative vulnerability of countries to Hong Kong shocks. The upper half are the
estimates using the first instrument, while the bottom half are the results using the second
instrument.
Because of the sharpness and the size of this crisis, in this case the proportion of coeffi-
cients that are significant is larger than in the Mexican crisis: more than 1/3 of the coefficients
are statistically different from zero, while only 11 percent are significantly different from zero
in the Mexican crisis.
The main reasons why this is the case are twofold: First, during the Mexican crisis
pinpointing the end of the crisis is difficult. In the Hong Kong crash most of the action
occurs within two weeks improving the quality of the instrument even though the size of
the sample is small. Second, the importance of the Hong Kong stock market in the world
is larger than the Mexican stock market, both in terms of size and as regional indicators.
Therefore, it should be expected that the transmission from Hong Kong should be larger
than from Mexico.
In table 4, the results from testing if the coefficients are the same are shown. In this case,
6.7 percent of the pairs are rejected (42 out of 630). From this 42 cases, Colombia accounts
for 7, and Malaysia for 8. Again, there does not seem to be a pattern in the rejections.
[Insert table here]
Table 3: Estimation of beta for the 1997 Hong Kong crisis.
[Insert table here]
Table 4: Results of Hausman Specification Test. 1997 Hong Kong crisis.
15several sensitivity analysis were performed to test the importance of the ending date of the tranquil
period. There was no difference in the results if the data was stopped before June 6. As soon as tile
Thailand crisis is included, then substantial rejection in the test is found.
19In the sample there are 18 non-OECD countries (including Mexico and Korea) which im-
plies 153 pairs (at most) that include two developing economies only. In this sub-sample there
are 13 cases (8.5 percent) where there is a significant change in the transmission mechanism.
These pairs are: Argeutina-Brazil, Argentina-South Africa, Colombia with Russia, Singa-
pore and South Africa, Indonesia-South Africa, Malaysia with Russia, Singapore, South
Africa and Taiwan, Mexico-Peru, aud Philippines with Russia and South Africa. As can be
seen, most of the chauges involve countries that indeed suffer significant speculative attacks
during the Hong Kong crisis; however, the proportion of rejections still is too small, and
several of these pairs are missing if indeed they changed (for example, Argentina-Mexico,
Brazil-Mexico, etc.)
4.1.3 Russian Crisis: Siberian Cold.
On August 13, 1998 the Russian crisis occurred. Even though in the bond market, the
initial shock takes place on the 6th, there is no reaction in the stock market until the 13th.
There are two additional events that have to be considered in the determination of the
tranquil and crisis windows: First, the tranquil window should end at most in August 1st to
avoid including the shocks in the bond market. Second, the crisis window should end before
October given that a massive speculative attack to Brazil took place then.'9
As in the Hong Kong crisis, most of the fluctuation occurs within two weeks following
the crisis. Thus, the crisis window is defined as 10 days.
The results are presented in tables 5 and 6. In this case, 37.4 percent of the coefficients
are statistically different from zero, but in only 6.2 percent of the pairs (37 out of 595) the
test is rejected.
[Insert table here]
Table 5: Estimation of beta for the 1998 Russian crisis.
[Insert table here]
Table 6: Results of Hausman Specification Test. 1998 Russian crisis.
In the sub-sample of non-OECD countries (17 countries with data implying 136 pairs)
there are 5 rejections (4.4 percent). The pairs are Argentina-Brazil, Chile-Venezuela, Brazil
with Peru and South Africa, and Colombia-Mexico. All these countries suffered important
speculative attacks after the Russian crisis, but again very few cases were found and all the
cross ones are also missing.
'9As before, several sensitivity analysis were performed to test the importance of the eading date of the
tranquil period. It was found that the general conclusion was qualitatively the same.
20In summary, in all the three crises studied, the test rejects that the propagation mecha-
nism is stable through time in sensible cases (specially when we concentrate upon developing
countries). However, there are three problems with these rejections: First, the percentage of
rejections is very small, even in the non-OECD cases. This means that, at most, the theories
in which the transmission is crisis contingent explains very few cases. Second, the pattern of
rejections does not have a clear pattern, nor in the whole data, neither iu the smaller sample
of only developing countries. Third, when rejections are found, all the combinations do not
show up in the rejections. For example, during the Russian crisis, Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, South Africa, and Venezuela appeared in at least one pair in which the
transmission changed. This means that there should be 21 pairs rejected and not only 5.
These results cast doubts on the empirical importance of theories where the transmission
mechanism is crisis contingent. However, before claiming this problems of misspecification
and power should be addressed.
4.2 Robustness
In this section, several sensitivity analysis are performed to determine how robust the previ-
ous conclusions are. Misspecification can occur because either the first step is misspecified
(returns and lags), or the windows are wrongfully defined (width of windows, as well as
starting dates).
The sensitivity analysis implied changes in the specification of the first step regression:
the number of returns days (2 or 1), and the number of lags (1 or 5). Additionally, in the
second step the different specifications implied changes in the crisis window (10, 20, 30 and
60 days) and the tranquil window (60, 120, and 240 days), as well as changes in the starting
dates (plus or minus.
Several other alternatives were studied, including changing the date of the crisis, omitting
interest rates in the first step, and concentrating upon indexes in domestic rather than foreign
currency. In all these cases the results were similar and, therefore, I will not report them
here.
In tables 7, 8, and 9 the results are summarized as follows: Column one to four indi-
cate which simulation is run; column five indicate the number of pairs that were admitted
using both instruments; columns six and seven are the number and the percentage of those
coefficients that were statistically different from zero; and columns eight and nine show the
number of times the test is rejected and the percentage of rejections over the total tests
performed.
The first table is for the Mexican crisis, the second one is for the Hong Kong crisis, and
the third one is for the Russian crisis.
There are four remarks that can be extracted from these tables. First of all, the coeffi-
cients are better estimated during the Hong Kong and Russian crises than in the Mexican
crisis. At most 14 percent of the parameters are significantly different from zero during the
Mexican crisis, while more than 40 percent of them are significant in the other two crises.
Three explanations can be advanced of this: Firstly, Mexico's importance in the world econ-
21omy is smaller than Hong Kong or Russia; secondly, the Mexican crisis may not have been
as large as the other two, and thus the instruments are weaker; or, finally, the Mexican crisis
was followed by several other shocks (such as the rollover of the debt during January of
1995) that have reduced the power of the test. If this is indeed the case, then this implies
that, ex-ante, very few cases of rejection will be found during the Mexican crisis, and in
fact, this does turn out to be the case. Significantly more cases of rejection are found during
Hong Kong and Russia than are discovered during the Mexican crisis. For example, in the
Mexican crisis, there are at most 7 percent of cases in which the test is rejected. This con-
trasts markedly with the Russian crisis, in which more than one third of the pairs suffered a
significant change. Unfortunately, however, there is little that can be done without further
information to improve the estimation for the Mexican case.
Secondly, when the crisis window is 10 days (two weeks), the proportion of significant
changes is relatively small in all the cases. There are only two simulations in which the
percentage of rejection is higher than 10 percent, and these are cases in which the tranquil
period extends for at least one year prior to the crisis. As regards Hong Kong and Russia,
however, there was another crisis in the world within that time, consequently, it should be
expected that the amount of rejections would rise.
Thirdly, when the crisis window is enlarged (from 10 to 60) the percentage of cases in
which the test is rejected also increases. Similarly to the above, the enlargement of the crisis
periods inevitable incorporates further crises elsewhere. The results are more sensible for
Hong Kong and Russia. And we know that the Korean crisis occurred within 60 days after
Hong Kong, and the first Brazilian attack started two months after Russian collapse. This
can be easily seen in the case of Hong Kong, in which the percentage of rejections doubles
when the window is increased from 30 to 60.
Finally, an increase in the length of the tranquil period has only a minor effects on the
results. In general the percentage of rejections increase, but not significantly
In summary, there are some changes in the propagation mechanism, specially during Hong
Kong and Russian's crises. However, very few cases (almost always less than 10 percent of
the cases) are found within the month after the crisis started. This casts doubt upon those
theories that are crisis contingent, and supports those theories within which the transmission
mechanism is stable through time.
4.3 Power of the test
The test developed here can be thought as an overidentification test. These tests, in general,
are rejected on several alternative hypothesis and studying their power is cumbersome. In
this particular case there are 31 alternative hypothesis. For reasons of brevity it is impossible
to discuss the power in each of the cases. In this section, the power of the test is studied
only against one of those hypothesis: 3changesas well as the variance of the idiosyncratic
shocks. I compare the results of the test with a standard test for changes in regime (an
F-test).
22The assumptions in the Monte-Carlo simulation are the following: it is assumed that the
variance of the common shocks is zero (cr= 0);the two idiosyncratic shocks have the same
variance, which were normalized to one; and the tranquil periods consist of 60 observations,
while the crises are 10.
Asshould be expected, the power of the test depends crucially on the variance increase
during the periods of crisis. Three cases are analyzed, when it increases in 5, 15 and 25
times.20 The test was evaluated under several parameters: a and /3vary from 0.1 to 0.4.
Finally, three alternative hypothesis are studied, when /3 increases by 10, 20 and 30 percent.
One questions that immediately arises is if the increases in variance are reasonable. Indeed
in the two weeks after the Mexican crisis in 1994, the variance of the stock market increased
in more than 16 times. Moreover, the week of Hong Kong crisis implied an increase in its
variance of almost 25 times, and during the same week, the US market increased its variance
in 16 times. The Russian crisis has similar implications. On the other hand, the Korean
and Brazilian crises only increased the volatility in 2 to 5 times. Some explanations have
been given to this events (such that the world was already in crisis). As will become clear
from the discussion below, when the increase in the variance is small thepower of the test
declines significantly. This is the main reason why these two crises are not analyzed in the
present paper.
In tables 10, 11, and 12 the results of 1000 simulations are shown. The first three
columns indicate which simulations is run. The first column indicates the value of /3 during
the tranquil time, the second one is the value of a, and the third one is the increase in the
variance of h during the crisis period.
The fourth column is the estimate of /3 using the first instrument. The fifth column
is the proportion of times in which the test was rejected even though it was true that the
parameters did not changed. The next three columns reflect the percentage of times in which
the test was accepted even though /3indeedchanged during the crisis. Each column indicates
in which percentage /3changed.The last four columns reflect the results of running an F-test
that the parameters are the same. Remember that it is possible to run this last test because
a is known and, therefore, the structural shocks can be recuperated from the simulations.
In practice, this test cannot be performed in the data. However, they are shown here to
compare the power of the test presented with a standard test.21
In table 10 the results when the variance of misincreased in five times are shown, in
table 11 it is augmented in 15 times, and finally, in table 12 it is risen in 25 times.
The consistency of the test in small samples can be evaluated by looking at the fourth
column. As can be appreciated, the test lowers its small sample bias when the variance
during crisis is much larger than the variance during periods of tranquility. The reason is
that when the crisis times are similar to tranquil times, the instruments become weaker. In
fact, in the limit, when the two regimes are identical, the instruments are invalid.
20Several other simulations were performed: when the variance increased by only 2 times and when it
increased by 50 times. The conclusions share the same properties as the ones indicated here.
211t is important to remember that F-tests do not perform very well in small samples specially under
heteroskedasticity.
23The fifth column in all three tables indicate the percentage of times in which the test
was rejected even though /3 did not change during the crisis. When the variance increases
by five times, the test has relatively good type one errors. In general, they are below 14
percent. As can be seen, the test performs similarly to the F-test that always is below 7
percent. Notice that when the variance is increased in 15 and 25 times, the type one errors
increase significantly. Moreover, the percentage of rejections increase with the change in the
variance and with the value of ,3.Inother words, the larger is the change in the variance
or the larger is the value of /3 the higher the proportion of rejections even though the null
hypothesis is true. It is important to highlight that the Chow test is not affected by this
change in the variance (as it should be the case).
Finally, the type two errors indicate the percentage of times in which the test was accepted
when /1 increased during the crisis. As is shown in the tables (and it should be expected)
the test is able to reject the hypothesis more often when the change in /3 is larger. Moreover,
note that the test performs badly when the increase in the variance is small. In general
the type two errors are close or superior to 90 percent, indicating that in nine out of ten
times the test is unable to reject the null hypothesis even though it was false. However,
it is important to point out that the standard methods to test structural change also have
problems with their power in these circumstances. Comparing the power of the two tests, it
is possible to conclude that when /3 increases in 10 percent, both tests are equally bad, and
that only the F-test is superior when the change in /3 is large.
When the variance increases in 15 to 25 times, the test proposed here improves its power,
and in some circumstances it is even better that the F-test. However, in those circumstances,
the test rejects too often. For example, if 3andn equal to 0.3, /3 changed by 30 percent, and
there is an increase in the variance of 25 times, the test rejects the hypothesis 90 percent of
the time, while the F-test only rejects on 67 percent of the time. However, in those cases,
the test rejects the null hypothesis when it is true in 39 percent of the cases, while the F-test
only rejects on 5 percent of the simulations.
It can be concluded, then, that the power of the test is similar or close to what an F-test
would obtain in similar circumstances. In other words, the deterioration in power that this
test of structural change will have, in comparison to the standard methodologies, does not
seem to be extreme. This does not mean, however, that the power of the test is good. On
the contrary, this results should be interpreted as how bad the two tests perform in small
samples. This is an important caveat that should be developed further in future research.
4.4 Measuring the propagation mechanism and vulnerability.
As was indicated above, if the source of the crisis is known, the parameter estimated has one
of the two following interpretations: First, if the crisis is generated in one of the countries in
the regression (i-i),thenthe parameter estimated is the total effect of this country on the other
one (m). This is a direct measure of the propagation mechanism from country n to country in.
Second, if the crisis occurs in a country that has been omitted from the first step regression,
then the parameter estimated is the relative vulnerability between the two countries: how
24vulnerable is country n relative to country in. In this section, I summarize these results
concentrating on the measures of direct propagation and the relative vulnerability with
respect to US.
In tables 13, 14, and 15 the results for the Mexican, Hong Kong and Russian crises
are shown respectively. The first three columns report the direct propagation (/9) with its
standard deviation, and a test if it is different from zero. The second group of three columns
is the relative vulnerability of the country with respect to the US.
During the Mexican crisis, there are only four coefficients that are statistically different
from zero. The propagation from Mexico to Argentina is 30 percent; while to Chile is only
6 percent. Both estimates are significantly different from zero, and it is easy to reject the
hypothesis that the Chilean coefficient is larger than, or equal to, the Argentinean. This
might not be surprising, however, the fact that one coefficient is five times larger than the
other, certainly is.22 The other two parameter that are significantly different from zero are
Philippines (41 percent) and US (20 percent). The coefficient for Philippines, however, is
not statistically different from the Chilean one.
The measures of relative vulnerability (between countries and US) show 7 out of 34
coefficients as being significantly different from zero: Argentina is 3 times more vulnerable
than US; Chile, Korea and Peru are around 40 percent more vulnerable than US; and Canada
and the Netherlands are relatively less vulnerable than US to Mexican shocks. The rank of
countries in relative vulnerability is close to what our priors would suggest, however, again,
Argentina might be too sensible to Mexican shocks.
The results in the Mexican crisis are hard to interpreted given that a small fraction of
parameters are significantly different from zero. Let us turn our attention, therefore, to the
Hong Kong and Russian crises.
During the Hong Kong crisis 18 out of 35 of the propagation coefficients and 13 out of
the 35 measures of vulnerability are significantly different from zero. The negative signs are
the result of when the returns are measured, thus lets concentrate on the absolute values.23
From the 18 significant coefficients note that 6 are larger than 40 percent (Argentina, Brazil,
Russia, Singapore, South Africa, and Spain), 8 are between 20 and 30 percent (Australia,
Austria, Colombia, Finland, Germany, Norway, UK, and US), and only 4 are below 20
percent (Denmark, France, Portugal, and Sweden). Clearly, the transmission from Hong
Kong to the rest of the world is stronger than the case from Mexico.
Singapore is a definite candidate for possessing a higher coefficient because of its similar-
ities to, and trade relationships with, Hong Kong. Furthermore, excluding Spain, the other
countries with the highest coefficients are those that suffer disproportionately more during
the crisis: namely, Argentina, Brazil, Russia and South Africa. However, their trade rela-
tionships with Hong Kong are not large. The currency board has been blamed as the main
source of the transmission between Hong Kong and Argentina, but this does not explains
2srplis is similar to what Forbes & Rigobon [19981 call "excess interdependence".
23Usually crisis are accompanied by short run rebounds. If the crises are reported in different days, then
a negative coefficient is found in the estimation.When weekly returns are used, negative coefficients that are
significant are not found.
25the other three cases. Further research is needed in this area to understand what determines
the size of this propagation.
The relative vulnerabilities can be divided as follows: there are 5 countries that are
more than 100 percent more vulnerable than US (Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong (obviously),
Mexico, and Russia); whereas the rest of the countries are either equally or less vulnerable
than US.
It is possible to test whether or not the relative vulnerability of Argentina is the same
with regard to both the Mexican and Hong Kong shocks. The estimate during Mexico is
3.08 with a standard deviation of 1.17 while the estimate during Hong Kong is 2.28 with
standard deviation of 0.33. If we assume that the two estimates are independent we reject
the hypothesis that they are different. Similar test can be performed for Canada, Chile, and
Peru. lu all these cases, if it is assumed that the estimates are independent, then it is not
possible to reject the hypothesis that they are the same. This assumption of independence
is not correct in practice, however, without further structure, it is impossible to estimate the
relationship between the two estimates. Therefore, these results should be interpreted more
as suggestive rather than definite.
Finally, in the Russian crisis, 14 out of 34 of the coefficients of propagation and 18 out of
34 of the vulnerabilities are significantly different from zero. In fact, the average propagation
of shocks in the Russian case are similar to those obtained during the Mexican crisis. In this
case, there are 6 countries that have a propagation that is larger than 20 percent (Brazil,
Italy, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). Indeed Brazil and South Africa,
suffered important speculative attacks within two weeks of the Russian crisis. However, the
appearance of Italy and Switzerland in this list is somewhat surprising.
There are 4 countries that have vulnerability coefficients larger than 2 (Colombia, Italy,
Portugal, and South Africa). In this case, the coefficients of Portugal and South Africa are
different from those estimated during the Hong Kong crisis. On the other hand, in the rest
of the coefficients it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the rest of the coefficients
are the same in the two crises.
5 Conclusions and Extensions
The recent crises have driven the literature to further examine the theories regarding the
international propagation of shocks. These theories can be broadly divided in two classes:
those that are crisis contingent, and those that are not. In this paper, I offer an alternative
identification assumption that allows us to measure, and test for, changes in the international
propagation of shocks even in the presence of problems of heteroskedasticity, endogenous, and
omitted variables. Using this methodology, I show that the pair-wise propagation mechanism
during crisis times and tranquil periods for 36 countries is relatively stable. If changes in
the propagation mechanism are to be expected within the mouth of the crisis, then during
the Mexican crisis, on average, less than 7 percent of the pairs changed, during the Hong
Kong crisis between than 10 to 15 percent shift, while during the Russian crisis always less
than 15 percent of them changed. In section 4.2, several sensitivity analysis were performed
26and, though there are some circumstances in which the percentage of rejection is higher, it
would also appear that, in those cases, it is somewhat difficult to argue that there was only
one crisis affecting the sample. Therefore, the reasons behind the rejection counld be the
misspecification of the windows and not the change in the propagation of shocks.
These findings cast some doubt on the theories of the propagation of shocks that are
"crisis contingent", such as those related to endogenous liquidity issues, multiple equilibria,
and political contagion; and favors of those based on trade, learning, and aggregate shocks
as the main transmission channel. Nonetheless, further research in this area is still necessary
in order to fully understand the complexities behind the propagation mechanism.
The main caveats of the test presented here are: First, the instruments might be weak
under some circumstances, thus reducing the power of the test. This certainly seems to be
the case during the Mexican crisis (and definitely during the Korean crisis), where a small
proportion of coefficients are significantly different from zero. As was argued before though,
without further information this problem cannot be solved. Second, the power of the test
might be low against some alternatives that were not covered in Section 4.3. In the particular
case in which the alternative is a change in /3, however, the power of the test is similar to
a standard F-test for structural change. This does not mean that the test has good power,
instead that using it does not deteriorate the power dramatically from the techniques that
already available.
Three immediate extensions can be derived from the present discussion. First of all,
the moethodology to estimate structural changes and solving the problem of endogeneity
can be applied in other circumstances in which there exists prior knowledge about a shift
in the second moments. For example, changes in policies (such as exchange rate regimes,
taxes, regulation, etc.) may have implications on the volatility of the disturbances, even
though they might not have an impact on only one of the equations. With the standard
methods of identification when endogenous variables are present, those changes would have
been disregarded as instruments. The methodology proposed here illnstrates how they could
be used to identify the system of equations. The only assumption required is to know which
variance is going to be mainly affected by the shift of policy.
Secondly, the methodology proposed here implies that the propagation mechanism, as
well as, the relative vulnerability can be estimated directly estimated. In section 4.4, those
results are shown. The preliminary conclusions indicate that there are some pair of countries
in which the propagation mechanism is too large for what trade, learning, and/or country
similarities, could explain. This is what has been called by Forbes & Rigobon [1998] "excess
interdependence", but it might just as well be called "contagion". More research iii this area
is crucial for both theoretical purposes and in order to formulate policy advise.
Thirdly, this paper has concentrated on the behavior of prices around the crises. It does
not say anything concerning quantities. Research on portfolio flows indicates that capital
flows tend to have excess co-movement across countries in the same region (See Froot, et.al.
[1998] and Stulz [1999]). It is possible that prices do not change their behavior during crisis,
whereas capital flows do. Therefore, contagion might be found more strongly on the quantity
27side, rather than on the pricing side. In fact, most of the new theories go in this direction.24
Again, this is an area where more theoretical and empirical work should be carried out.
24For example, see Calvo [1999](Calvo, 1999), Chari & Kehoe [1999](Chari and Kehoe, 1999), Rigobon
[1998] (Bigobon, 1998),among others.
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Table 7: Mexican crisis. Robustness Check
32Crisis: 19971017
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Table 8: Hong Kong crisis. Robustness Check
33Crisis: 19980813
Optimal IV








































































































































































































































Table 9: Russian crisis. Robustness Check
34Table 10: Comparison of the type one and two errors for the test (and a Chow test).
Table 11: Comparison of the type one and two errors for the test (and a Chow test).
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31%IncreaseEstimate T2 errors (beta+)FtestT2 error (beta+)
BetaAlfaVarianceBetaTi error10%20%30%Ti error10%20%30%
0.10.1 25 0.055 9%58% 27% i2% 4%89% 73% 44%
0.10.2 25 -0.036 6%66% 35% 15% 6%88% 69% 41%
0.10.3 25 -0.138 6%71% 39% 18% 5%89% 67% 38%
0.10.4 25 -0.134 6%77% 42% 22% 4%88% 67% 36%
0.20.1 25 0.13529% 37% 15% 8% 6%89% 70% 43%
0.20.2 25 0.09226% 43% 21% 12% 6%88% 67% 42%
0.20.3 25 0.09218% 50% 25% 13% 5%87% 68% 33%
0.20.4 25 0.08918% 56% 33% 15% 6%88% 65% 32%
0.30.1 25 0.25253% 25% 10% 6% 5%91% 70% 43%
0.30.2 25 0.25048% 29% 16% 8% 6%89% 63% 37%
0.30.3 25 0.27139% 35% 20% 10% 5%87% 64% 33%
0.30.4 25 0.17934% 40% 24% 13% 7%86% 63% 29%
0.40.1 25 0.85266% 18% 10% 5% 6%90% 70% 43%
0.40.2 25 0.25858% 21% 12% 7% 7%89% 66% 37%
0.40.3 25 0.26054% 28% 16% 8% 5%87% 63% 33%
0.40.4 25 0.23446% 35% 20% 9% 7%87% 59% 26%
Table 12: Comparison of the type one and two errors for the test (and a Chow test).
36Mexican Country vs US
PropagationStdev ZVulnerabilityStdev Z
Arg 0.3115 0.04686.65 3.0823 1.16992.63
Aus 0.0097 0.02860.34 0.4083 0.29721.37
Aust 0.0154 0.02160.71 0.2979 0.25561.17
Bra
Can 0.0006 0.02000.03 0.73020.14575.01
Chi 0.0610 0.03121.96 1.39110.62972.21
Go! -0.0067 0.0764-0.09 -0.9840 0.9588-1.03
Den 0.0170 0.01920.88 0.0245 0.23450.10
Fin -0.0283 0.0311-0.91 0.2239 0.37130.60
Fra -0.0114 0.0267-0.43 0.4470 0.24771.80
Ger -0.0092 0.0303-0.30 0.4496 0.28611.57
Gre -0.0016 0.0519-0.03 0.0887 0.44160.20
Hon -0.0386 0.0496-0.78 0.7308 0.53081.38
md 0.0123 0.02080.59 0.2496 0.36470.68
Indo
Ita 0.0051 0.08170.06 0.4163 0.97110.43
Jap 0.0206 0.02260.91 0.0581 0.24770.23
Mal -0.0521 0.0393-1.33 0.3029 0.55680.54
Mex 5.0584 1.95962.58
Net -0.7560 2.2876-0.330.46550.18482.52
Nor -0.2072 0.2180-0.95 0.2001 0.25860.77
Per 0.0301 0.06340.48 1.55070.67532.30
Phi 0.4143 0.14572.84 -0.7219 0.4897-1.47
Por
Rus -12.2475 23.1403-0.53 -2.3101 1.5876-1.46
Sin 0.7772 0.44561.74 0.0341 0.43360.08
Kor 2.3624 1.76691.34 1.3775 0.64672.13
Sou -0.1576 0.0864-1.82 -0.0815 0.3285-0.25
Spa 0.0610 0.08110.75 1.0707 0.85781.25
See 1.0889 0.97881.11 0.2637 0.34680.76
Swi 0.1161 0.07621.52 0.1142 0.27820.41
Tai -30.3518 485.9495-0.06 -0.1524 0.9606-0.16
Tha 0.5952 0.38951.53 -0.3255 0.5360-0.61
UK -5.9344 35.2315-0.17 0.4146 0.22171.87
USA0.1977 0.07662.58
Ven
Table 13: Mexican crisis. Measures of the transmission mechanism and Vulnerability.
37Hong Kong Country vs US
PropagationStdev ZVulnerabilityStdev Z
Arg-0.5448 0.1641-3.32 2.2582 0.33286.79
Aus0.2578 0.03317.79 0.1700 0.19790.86
Aust 0.3198 0.06275.10 -0.3042 0.2576-1.18
Bra-0.44320.1652-2.68 2.0595 0.47654.32
Can -0.0602 0.0391-1.54 0.5060 0.09965.08
Chi -0.0023 0.0297-0.08 0.3428 0.14892.30
Col 0.3790 0.11023.44-1.25300.5946-2.11
Den 0.1741 0.03744.65 -0.2671 0.1829-1.46
Fin 0.2254 0.04814.68 -0.1197 0.2558-0.47
Fra 0.1225 0.04782.56 0.2124 0.20631.03
Ger 0.3327 0.07214.61 -0.3928 0.2633-1.49
Gre -0.1389 0.0718-1.93 0.4893 0.27301.79
Hon -3.31971.2722-2.61
md 0.6301 0.3296 1.91 0.0821 0.20670.40
Indo-60.3574145.2007-0.42 0.7520 2.96350.25
Ita -2.8662 1.8609-1.54 0.7841 0.92570.85
Jap 0.1229 0.26800.46 0.0575 0.27380.21
Mal -0.4626 0.3039-1.52 -0.3475 0.6444-0.54
Mex -0.7856 0.7891-1.00 2.3485 0.38316.13
Net -0.0029 0.1481-0.02 0.2484 0.22331.11
Nor 0.2244 0.05414.15 -0.54160.2192-2.47
Per 0.2477 0.24691.00 0.66650.20863.20
Phi -0.0759 0.1701-0.45 -0.5715 0.6161-0.93
Por 0.1727 0.08592.01 -0.2118 0.2238-0.95
Rus 0.9721 0.14346.78 -2.03260.9913-2.05
Sin 0.4650 0.05867.93 -0.79420.3749-2.12
Kor -4.7836 4.9351-0.97 -1.0186 0.8271-1.23
Sou 0.6470 0.07708.40 -0.6033 0.3258-1.85
Spa 0.5184 0.16353.17 -0.0405 0.2631-0.15
See 0.1632 0.05522.95 -0.0321 0.2165-0.15
Swi 0.0120 0.09920.12 0.0103 0.23130.04
Tai 1.3424 0.82371.63 -0.4046 0.3415-1.18
Tha -2.3077 3.6384-0.63 -0.3299 0.4845-0.68
UK 0.2278 0.10972.08 0.4002 0.18262.19
USA-0.30120.1154-2.61
Ven 0.0831 0.08690.96 0.3928 0.19981.97
Table 14: Hong Kong crisis. Measures of the transmission mechanism and Vulnerability.
38Russia Country vs US
PropagationStdev ZVulnerabilityStdev Z
Arg 0.1370 0.10351.32 0.1431 1.26910.11
Aus 0.10830.04672.32 1.2147 0.57012.13
Aust0.12460.04862.56 1.7897 0.65792.72
Bra 0.21270.08542.49 1.0188 0.96591.05
Can -1.9361 7.4089-0.26 41.6332 782.54530.05
Chi 0.11140.04082.73 0.6759 0.29612.28
Col 0.2450 0.15341.60 4.3456 2.00882.16
Den 0.0288 0.03380.85 0.7993 0.32042.50
Fin 0.0692 0.05991.15 1.9362 0.64862.99
Fra 0.10070.04582.20 1.7035 0.52913.22
Ger 0.0882 0.04611.91 1.7793 0.66682.67
Gre 0.0600 0.07110.84 1.7292 0.76692.25
Hon 0.17740.08682.04 -0.0988 0.8104-0.12
md 0.0599 0.07290.82 -0.5727 0.8470-0.68
Indo
Ita 0.27790.11662.38 3.3377 1.69811.97
Jap -0.0300 0.0600-0.50 1.1326 0.64161.77
Mal 0.0088 0.10300.09 0.6407 1.11330.58
Mex 0.0149 0.11960.12 0.1572 1.93090.08
Net 0.0298 0.04000.75 1.6709 0.55623.00
Nor 0.19250.05713.37 1.9818 0.95792.07
Per 0.16980.04913.46 1.3329 0.58192.29
Phi 0.0793 0.06951.14 -0.5633 0.7547-0.75
Por 0.13820.04413.14 2.1750 0.87612.48
Rus 7.8243 5.66421.38
Sin 0.3785 0.28871.31 0.1767 0.60400.29
Kor -6.8118 6.2723-1.09 0.4640 2.56860.18
Sou 0.31380.14112.22 2.2467 0.99722.25
Spa 0.40360.16242.48 5.3435 4.6202 1.16
See 0.29480.12752.31 1.3241 0.41533.19
Swi 0.32830.13822.38 1.4630 0.51082.86
Tai 0.7867 2.20460.36 -0.3353 0.4484-0.75
Tha 0.1858 0.28480.65 -0.0299 0.8650-0.03
UK 0.3536 0.19311.83 1.3974 0.42323.30
USA 0.1278 0.09251.38
Ven 0.9461 0.49271.92 10.2451 8.94861.14
Table 15: Russian crisis. Measures of the transmission mechanism and Vulnerability.
39a Data—Demand——S
Figure1: Identification (demand schedule) when there is an increase in the variauce of supply
disturbances
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